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Equality among Animals and Religious Slaughter 
Federico Zuolo ∗ 
Abstract: »Gleichberechtigung unter Tieren und religiöse Schlachtung«. Current 
laws on the treatment of animals in all liberal countries demand that animals 
be stunned before being slaughtered in order to prevent their suffering. This is 
derived from a widely-shared concern for animal welfare. However, in many 
Western countries, exemptions from this legal requirement have been granted to 
Jewish and Muslim communities so that they can continue to perform ritual 
slaughter. Hence, there seems to be a clash between the right to religious free-
dom and the duty to minimize animal suffering during slaughter. In this paper, I 
want to propose a solution to this seemingly irreconcilable clash. To understand 
whether these two principles are really incompatible, we need to establish exactly 
what they demand of us. I argue that there is no convincing reason to take the 
suffering involved in the killing of animals more seriously than the suffering ex-
perienced by animals during their lives (on farms). If so, we might demand that 
ritually slaughtered animals be “compensated” for their experiencing a more 
painful death by raising these animals in better conditions than others. 
Keywords: Animal welfare, freedom of religion, non-discrimination, ritual 
slaughter. 
1.  Introduction1 
Current laws on the treatment of animals in all liberal countries demand that 
animals be stunned before being slaughtered in order to prevent their suffering. 
In many Western countries, exemptions from this legal requirement have been 
granted to Jewish and Muslim communities (Haupt 2007).2 But Muslim and 
                                                             
∗  Federico Zuolo, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Free University of Berlin, Ih-
nestrasse 22, 14195 Berlin, Germany; federico.zuolo@unipv.it. 
1  The research for this paper was carried out within the project ‘Feeding’ Respect. Food Poli-
cies and Minority Claims in Multicultural Societies, funded by the Italian Ministry of Re-
search and Education – FIRB 2010. I am grateful to Peter Niesen, Svenja Ahlhaus and an 
anonymous referee for comments on previous versions of this paper. 
2  This provision is accepted by many European countries, the US, and Canada. See for instance 
the Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of ani-
mals at the time of killing, art. 3.4; Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on 
the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing, art. 5.2. Switzerland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Latvia have not admitted such exemptions, thus affirming the priority of ani-
mal welfare over the right to freedom of religion. The Polish constitutional court recently 
overturned a ban on ritual slaughter. For a general discussion see Ferrari and Bottoni (2013). 
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Jewish ritual methods of slaughter are considered unacceptable by a number of 
groups concerned with the suffering of animals. Indeed, ritual methods of 
slaughtering require that animals be slaughtered without having been stunned, 
thus causing significant pain during their slaughter.3 
On the one hand, ritual slaughter seems to be unacceptable not only to those 
concerned with animal rights, who reject any kind of killing of animals, but 
also to those with more moderate worries for the welfare of animals, who might 
allow the killing of animals but are concerned with their suffering. On the other 
hand, ritual slaughter seems to be justified insofar as it is an expression of the 
right to freedom of religion. Hence, there seems to be a clash between the right 
to religious freedom and the widespread concern for animal welfare.  
In this paper I propose a conditional solution to this clash between values. 
Before presenting my argument, I want to emphasize that I will not argue for 
the overall admissibility of ritual slaughter. My claim will be more limited: I 
will try to see whether ritual slaughter can be made compatible with a general 
concern for animal welfare. In a sense my claim will rest within the boundaries 
of non-ideal theory, because I will accept most of the current rules and practic-
es surrounding the relation between humans and animals. In other words, I will 
propose an improvement of the current system of raising animals that does not 
challenge its justification.  
To do this, I will start from the uncontroversial assumption that qua general 
principles both the right to freedom of religion and the concern for animal 
welfare are sound and justified. I will also assume that neither animal welfare 
nor religious freedom have priority; rather, I will assume that they are on an 
equal footing. This does not mean that I am subscribing to a form of metaethi-
cal pluralism. I will simply take their clash at face value. To argue for the prior-
ity of one over the other we would need a complete and substantive theory of 
justice. In this paper my aim is obviously much more modest. Indeed I will 
only discuss whether they can be made compatible without arguing for the 
priority of one over the other.  
To understand whether they can be made compatible in the case of ritual 
slaughter we need to establish what exactly they demand of us. In the light of 
this, I will argue that there is no convincing reason to consider the suffering 
involved in the killing of animals more important than other types of suffering 
they face during their lives (on farms). If so, to make ritual slaughter compati-
ble, at least in principle, with concerns for animal welfare, I will argue that we 
might demand that ritually slaughtered animals be “compensated” for their 
                                                             
3  Although some people claim that, if the slaughter is performed appropriately, the suffering 
of ritually slaughtered animals is not significantly greater than that suffered by animals 
facing standard slaughter methods, for the sake of simplicity I will not call into question the 
standard assumption that ritual slaughter involves some significant amount of pain which is 
greater than the pain involved in non-ritual slaughter.  
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more painful death. Such compensation might be made by raising these animals 
in better conditions than those who will be stunned before slaughter. I will 
conclude by defending this proposal against some standard objections and 
argue it is only convincing if ritual slaughter is really essential to the mainte-
nance of religious tradition.  
2.  A Clash of Values?  
The case of ritual slaughter seems to involve a clash between concerns about 
animal welfare and those about religious freedom. The right to freedom of 
religion is undoubtedly one of the fundamental liberal rights. Respecting this 
right does not consist of the mere protection of a person’s inner sphere of belief 
and faith. Rather, it includes a number of more specific rights, such as the right 
to gather and pray in public. Among these rights we can include the right to eat 
and follow the dietary prescriptions of one’s religion. Accordingly, ritual 
slaughter is an expression of this general right. But there seems to be a case for 
its limitation. Religious freedom is thought to be inviolable to the extent that its 
exercise does not infringe upon other rights and the fundamental interests of 
others. One might say that ritual slaughter is wrong precisely because it in-
fringes upon the rights of animals. However, it is not clear whether animals 
hold rights. The least we can say is that this is a controversial claim and there is 
a deep disagreement about this issue.4 Irrespective of whether animals hold 
rights, however, most Western legislation displays a concern for animal welfare 
that seems to be related to duties on the part of human beings. However, it is 
not clear what justification might ground such a concern. Is it couched on a 
rights-based view or on utilitarian grounds?  
On the one hand, it certainly cannot be defended on a standard rights-based 
view, because current rights-based views do not only demand that we take 
animal welfare and suffering into account; they also argue that animals have an 
inviolable right to life. On the other hand, one might think that an interest in 
animal welfare and suffering is typically utilitarian. However, we might ask 
whether such a utilitarian view should be applied only to animals or also in other 
domains. But, since utilitarianism is an all-encompassing and monist theory, it 
cannot only be applied to one domain (viz. animals) and not to other relevantly 
similar domains (namely all sentient beings including human beings). In a word, 
the principle that Nozick (1974, 41) called “utilitarianism for animals, Kantian-
ism for people” cannot be squared with utilitarian monism. Justifying this dis-
crimination is not only at odds with utilitarian monism but also with the commit-
                                                             
4  The importance of and the commitment to realizable institutional principles in a political 
theory of human-animal relations is stressed also in Ahlhaus and Niesen (2015, in this HSR 
Forum). 
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ment to anti-speciesism held by many utilitarians. Thus, if we want a utilitarian 
justification of the treatment of animals, we must also be prepared to accept a 
utilitarian justification in other fields of public ethics. But this would be quite 
unpalatable for many of us. Thus, although certain types of utilitarianism could 
endorse the idea that we have duties towards animals, this would be at the price 
of an endorsement of overall utilitarian principles, which would also require 
significant changes to current laws and principles. Given the non-ideal premis-
es of this paper, the thorough utilitarian option seems unfeasible.  
There may be other contending moral theories, but it is not clear which 
grounds the current protection of animal welfare. In general, approaches to the 
protection of animal welfare can be indirect and direct. An indirect approach 
would justify concern for animal welfare through a duty to respect human atti-
tudes, beliefs, or commitment towards animals. In indirect approaches animals 
are beneficiaries of certain kinds of treatment, but human beings are the ad-
dressees of the direct obligations as well as the bearers of moral status. For 
instance, some Italian laws concerning the prohibition of killing of and cruelty 
to animals (articles 544-bis to 544-sexies of the Penal Code) are grouped in a 
chapter devoted to the “offences against human sensitivity towards animals.”5 
Direct approaches to the protection of animals, by contrast, ground duties 
towards animals in the interests that animals have autonomously and inde-
pendently of human attitudes towards them. An example of this direct approach 
can be found in the European Council Regulation on the protection of animals 
at the time of killing (1099/2009 of 24 September 2009), which asserts that 
“animal welfare is a Community value” (preamble 4). The scope of its applica-
tion is based not on our relation to animals but on “scientific evidence” demon-
strating that “vertebrate animals are sentient beings” (preamble 19).6 
However, it must be emphasized that there seems to be an ambiguity in 
many current legal systems regarding whether the protection of animals is 
grounded in direct or indirect duties towards animals.7 Diverse pieces of legis-
                                                             
5  However, there is no coherent application of the indirect approach because such articles, as 
well as article 727, which prohibits keeping animals in conditions that are incompatible with 
their nature and that cause great suffering, point also at a direct approach. The reference to 
animals’ ethological nature and specific needs is interpreted in the jurisprudence as a clear 
recognition of animals’ subjective interest and humans’ corresponding direct duties.  
6  An even clearer example of the direct approach is the Swiss Federal Law (455, 16 December 
2005). In art. 1 the law states that the safeguarding of animal dignity is the overall aim of 
the law.  
7  One prominent case is the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz), which demands that animals be 
protected, as should nature, in virtue of the responsibility we have towards future genera-
tions (article 20a). Despite the prominence given to animals in legislation at the constitu-
tional level, this seems to be an indirect approach in virtue of its being grounded in the 
well-being of future generations of human beings. On the contrary, the law on animal pro-
tection (Tierschutzgesetz, § 1) demands that human beings should be responsible for ani-
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lation take different approaches or can be interpreted in both ways. Such an 
ambiguity may be a legacy of past views that have not been amended, since a 
full recognition of human direct duties towards animals would demand more 
extensive (and unwanted) legal protection of animals. Hence, we cannot say 
that all the relevant laws on animal welfare are based on a direct approach. On 
the other hand, if we take the indirect approach seriously, it is difficult to un-
derstand what good is protected by laws aiming at animal welfare. Is it only 
human sensitivity towards animal suffering that is protected? That is possible. 
However, this would make it difficult to argue that the suffering of animals 
should be prevented even when no human being would be offended. After all, 
our sensitivity is not likely to be affected by hidden slaughter houses that do 
not expose animal suffering to the public.  
These are very intricate questions that cannot be settled here. In what fol-
lows I will discuss only direct approaches toward the protection of animal 
welfare.8 This does not mean that we should disregard the indirect elements, 
and nor does it mean that the conclusion I will draw is not valid for an indirect 
approach. It means, rather, that the kinds of reasons we will consider, unless 
otherwise specified, will regard the duties – if any exist – that we have directly 
towards animals, not the duties we have towards the attitudes and beliefs of 
other human beings towards animals. After all, although legal systems and 
cultural practices are not immune to inconsistencies and ambiguities, a direct 
approach towards animal welfare seems capable of capturing the widespread 
idea that causing unnecessary suffering to a sentient being is intrinsically 
wrong. This is why adopting a perspective based on direct duties seems a 
worthwhile enterprise. One may object that such a direct approach is too mini-
mal if it can permit the killing of animals. That may be true. However, as I 
have said, here my aim is not to ask whether the principles underlying current 
legislation on animals are the most convincing. I simply start there in order to 
ask whether and how we may reconcile the duty to care for animals and the 
right to religious freedom that allows ritual slaughter. 
As a preliminary remark, we should bear in mind that ritual slaughter was 
originally intended to cause the quickest and least painful death to animals, 
according to Jewish and Muslim traditions (Lerner and Rabello 2006/7). Such a 
belief should not be discarded as mere self-deceit, because this might have 
been the case at the time of its origination, according to the scientific 
                                                                                                                                
mals qua “fellow creatures” (Mitgeschöpf). And this seems to point at a direct concern for 
animals.   
8  I have provided an alternative account based on an indirect view on the protection of 
animals in Zuolo (2014). Although I think the indirect approach has the advantage of being 
more clearly compatible with a number of admitted practices and with ritual slaughter in 
particular, in this paper I assume that the account underlying current laws may be justified 
as a set of direct duties. I cannot establish here which account is more convincing all things 
considered.  
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knowledge and the tools available. The religious grounds of the practice may 
have been that pain minimization was a way to respect the sacred nature of the 
divine gift of creation.  
Hence, we may say that Jewish and Muslim religious traditions have also 
been committed to the minimization of animal suffering, despite the fact that 
their understanding of this requirement is based upon religious rather than 
contemporary scientific ideas. This means that if we take this idea at face val-
ue, as the grounding principle of the practice of ritual slaughter, there would, 
strictly speaking, be no contradiction between religious freedom and animal 
welfare – only a clash between two different understandings of the same prin-
ciple regarding animal welfare when it is applied to slaughter: one informed by 
contemporary practices and science, and the other informed by traditional 
religious techniques.9 This picture, which reinterprets a clash of values as a clash 
of methods for reducing animal suffering, seems plausible. However, in the end, 
the reason to consider the traditional practice of ritual slaughter so important is 
that it seems to be at the core of Jewish and Muslim communities, touching upon 
a fundamental part of these religions, namely eating10 in a way that is consistent 
with one’s most important beliefs. Hence, the clash of values resurfaces again. 
This qualification is important in order to prevent a further objection. If Jews and 
Muslims should in principle eat only kosher and halal meat, whose production 
seems to be at odds with other legal and moral requirements, why cannot we say 
that Jews and Muslims ought to forsake meat eating and become vegetarian? 
After all, this same choice is made by many people on moral grounds. If the 
reasons for forbidding non-halal and non-kosher meat are so important, why 
shouldn’t believers be willing and committed not to eating meat at all where it 
does not comply with their religious requirements? This is a serious question 
because we cannot take it for granted that any kind of practice that is typical of 
a certain cultural and religious tradition is worthy, per se, of defense and spe-
cial treatment. I shall leave discussion of this issue to the final section. Here it 
suffices to say that, whatever our response to the question of whether ritual 
slaughter is fundamental to Jewish and Muslim traditions, we have another 
reason for taking the practice of religious slaughter seriously. This is the rea-
sonable presumption that prohibiting halal and kosher meat would cause further 
disadvantage to Muslims and Jews – two communities that have already suf-
fered extensive discrimination. Hence, we might say that whatever our position 
                                                             
9  This is at least partially shown by the fact that some Jewish and Muslim theorists claim that 
ritual killing is still the least painful way of slaughtering because, if the method is properly 
performed, the animal loses consciousness immediately. However, the factual validity of this 
claim is at least doubtful and discussing it would lead us astray.  
10  I focus only on meat eating, thus leaving aside the problem of the use of leather because 
Muslim and Jewish communities seem to have divergent prescriptions on this, and because 
wearing leather clothes does not seem to be an uncontroversially fundamental human need.  
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  116 
on ritual slaughter is, banning it would create further disadvantage (whether 
justified or not) for two communities that already face discrimination.  
3.  What Does a Concern for Animal Welfare Require of Us?  
This paper, in short, confronts the following question: What is so special about 
slaughter? If we are really concerned with animal welfare, while still admitting 
the permissibility of raising and killing animals for the sake of human nourish-
ment, why is the way in which they are killed so important? This is not to un-
derestimate the suffering involved in ritual slaughter. My point, rather, is to 
argue that there seems to be a sort of hypocrisy or incoherent attitude regarding 
animal suffering. If a concern for animal welfare requires the minimization of 
suffering, why should this minimization of suffering specifically target the 
killing of animals, rather than being more extensively applied to the whole life 
of the raised animal? Anticipating a possible objection, one might say that con-
cern with animal suffering during slaughter is more feasible and realistic because 
the alternative, namely providing better care during animals’ lives, would be too 
costly. Cost is certainly a problem, in that more extensive care for animals during 
their lives is certainly more costly than simply being concerned about their suffer-
ing at the very end of their lives. The former would require us to ban industrial 
farming, or at least to raise animals using different methods, leaving them with 
more space to move, more possibilities for interaction with other animals, more 
time to spend with their offspring, and so on. It seems clear that much more can 
be done to promote the welfare of farmed animals. A number of recent studies 
show that farmed animals suffer even when there is no direct evidence of this 
suffering (as there is during slaughter) (Aaltola 2012, 1-67). However, if we 
focus on the suffering involved in slaughter rather than in an animal’s life simply 
on the basis of cost, the normative grounding of our argument is both weak and 
unclear. The only plausible way to defend the current focus on animal suffering 
during slaughter is to claim that suffering during slaughter is different from – 
and/or not reducible to – other types of suffering. Such a difference would justify 
giving priority to suffering during slaughter, rather than other forms of suffer-
ing, and would ground the legal and moral obligation to stun animals. Let us 
see what theories in animal ethics have to say about this issue.  
We could give priority to the suffering caused by slaughter either because 
we consider it to be of greater magnitude or because we have independent 
reasons to prevent this type of suffering. The former holds true only if we sub-
scribe to a position that explains why suffering during slaughter is more weighty 
than countless other minor types of suffering. If we look at this from a broadly 
consequentialist perspective, it seems difficult to justify, because it either under-
estimates how much animals can suffer in industrial farming or overestimates 
how seriously we ought to take the pain experienced by animals during the final 
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moments of their lives. Even if we do not subscribe to a thoroughly utilitarian 
position, we can nevertheless frame the issue in terms of a measure of badness. 
All sufferings derive from an aversive state or stimulus (pain, fear, anxiety, 
discomfort) that should be assessed with respect to two fundamental dimen-
sions: intensity and duration.11 We may think that the suffering caused by 
slaughter is far more intense than other kinds of suffering, but its duration is 
certainly shorter than others, which are typically repeated many times. Unless 
we take intensity more seriously than duration, which we have no obvious 
reason to do, the two dimensions seem to be equally important in a determina-
tion of the respective amount of suffering. Hence, the suffering involved in 
slaughter should be weighted through these two dimensions in the same way as 
other types of suffering. And if so, it seems hard to justify the idea that the 
suffering involved in slaughter has any kind of priority over that involved in 
other parts of an animal’s life.  
The alternative to placing more importance on the suffering caused by 
slaughter is to see the types of activities involved in ritual slaughter (and in 
other types of slaughter without stunning) as wrong in themselves, irrespective 
of whether the suffering involved during slaughter is quantitatively greater than 
that experienced in industrial farming. On this view, it is the very mode of 
killing without stunning that gives us a reason to forbid such an action. This 
can be done either by adopting a virtue-based account or a Kantian view. First, 
on a virtue-based account, it is intrinsically wrong to kill an animal without stun-
ning it insofar as this is a form of cruelty, which is per se intrinsically wrong. But 
this claim seems to bear the burden of proof in showing why ritual slaughter is 
intrinsically wrong while standard slaughter is not. To prove that it is intrinsically 
wrong, we should consider only the intrinsic features of the act of killing irre-
spective of the type of consequences it involves. To do this, we have to show that 
ritual killing is necessarily motivated by a vicious intention and/or that it neces-
sarily fosters vicious traits of character. But this seems particularly difficult to 
show if we consider, as seen above, that ritual slaughter was introduced in the 
beginning as a way of minimizing animal suffering. This means that the stand-
ard religious motivation for ritual slaughter may not stem from a desire to be 
cruel but rather from a desire to minimize animal suffering. Hence, there seems 
to be no cruel motivation involved in, and a virtue-based account would have 
no reason to reject the practice.  
The second way in which this perspective may be justified is the Kantian 
view. As we know, according to Kant (1997), causing unnecessary pain to 
animals is wrong, not in virtue of their direct interest in not suffering, but be-
cause cruel actions disrespect our humanity and are conducive to the develop-
ment of a cruel attitude towards other human beings. To assess this alternative, 
                                                             
11  As is well-known, the origin of this approach to measuring value (and disvalue) dates back 
to Bentham (1996, ch. 4). For a more recent version see Rowan (2012, 210).  
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let us put aside the fact that we are considering only justifications for animal 
welfare based on direct duties towards animals, and that this concern for the 
development of wrongful and vicious attitudes seems at odds with the overall 
legal principle that laws should be concerned with behaviors, not intentions. 
First, the idea that (ritual) slaughtering is more conducive to developing vicious 
attitudes and behaviors is factually dubious. If this were the case, one might 
also argue that people who perform slaughter according to the ritual method or 
witness such slaughter are more likely to be cruel towards other human beings. 
But there does not seem to be any evidence supporting this claim. And the 
burden of proof is borne by those who make it. Moreover, besides the dubious 
factual reliability of this statement, it also has an unpalatable moral implication. 
Indeed, it would amount to saying that in Jewish and Muslim communities 
people are more likely to have cruel attitudes than in other religious communi-
ties. But this claim is disrespectful, to say the least.  
There are other possible reasons for giving more weight to the suffering in-
volved in the killing of an animal rather than that experienced in the animal’s 
life. Let us review them in brief. First, recall that in general animal rights views 
cannot uphold this point because they wholeheartedly reject the idea that the 
life of an animal is at human disposal (Regan 1983; Francione 2008; Don-
aldson and Kymlicka 2011). An animal’s right to life forbids the kind of prin-
ciple we are discussing here.12 
A further possibility is to take a relational approach. Under the umbrella of 
“relational approaches” I include diverse theories: feminist care-based ap-
proaches (Noddings 1984; Donovan 1999), associative accounts (Valentini 
2014), and pluralist positions (Anderson 2004; Scruton 2000). Needless to say 
this is a very sketchy categorization. These theories differ in many relevant 
respects, but for the purposes of this paper they can safely be discussed togeth-
er. Indeed, all these theories share the idea that, unlike utilitarianism and ani-
mal rights theories, the moral treatment we owe to animals cannot be estab-
lished a priori only on the basis of a natural property that animals have (mere 
sentience in utilitarianism, or the capacity of being the subject-of-a-life for 
Regan). Indeed, the treatment we owe to animals depends on the type of rela-
tions we have with them.  
These approaches do not provide a univocal normative response to our prob-
lem. Some do not accept the killing of animals at all. Others hold that it is not 
in principle wrong to kill animals provided that it is done in the proper way.13 
However, it would seem odd to include among admissible methods, that is, 
                                                             
12  Perhaps it is not in principle impossible to outline a rights-based approach that does not 
necessarily include a right to life. However, this possibility is not considered by current pro-
ponents of standard rights-based views. 
13  On this remark see Donovan (1999), who supports feminist vegetarianism, and Paxton 
George (1994), who argues against this duty, also on feminist grounds. 
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among those that are more respectful of animal nature and the expression of 
care towards them, those that involve more suffering. Moreover, caring more 
for an animal’s death than for an animal’s life would be utterly inconsistent 
with the ideas grounding care-based theories.  
Hence, upon reviewing consequentialist, virtue-based, Kantian, rights-based, 
and care-based views, there seems to be no defensible argument for giving 
priority to the suffering involved in slaughter rather than in the life of a raised 
animal. The only remaining view that could justify giving priority to the suffer-
ing involved in slaughter would have to prioritize the final condition of an 
individual’s life, giving it a special if not fundamental significance, perhaps 
because the very final moments in an individual life constitute the truth of 
one’s life. However, this view is deeply suspicious because it seems to depend 
on religious and theological presuppositions that are controversial in them-
selves, and even more dubious when applied to animals. It seems more plausi-
ble, in sum, to suppose that if we are concerned with the suffering of animals, 
we ought to estimate their suffering based on magnitude and frequency through 
the whole of a life, without giving priority to its end. After all, giving priority 
to the moment of death seems unwarranted and even based upon an anthropo-
centric bias. Accordingly, if we were to calculate the pains and sufferings in the 
life of an animal that had been raised using standard methods on a typical in-
dustrial farm, it would almost certainly turn out that the suffering and pain 
induced would outweigh the pain and suffering caused by ritual slaughter.  
4.  Suffering, Stunning, and Non-Discrimination  
Building on this, I want to argue that there is a flaw both in legislation prohibit-
ing ritual slaughter and in that allowing it. First, prohibiting ritual slaughter 
does not seem fully justified because, as seen, there is nothing special about the 
pain inflicted during death in relation to the pain experienced by an animal 
during its life. Second, allowing ritual slaughter might discriminate against 
ritually slaughtered animals. This is so because both ritually slaughtered and 
non-ritually slaughtered animals are raised in the same conditions (typically on 
industrial farms), but the former experience the pain of ritual slaughter. While, 
as seen, there is nothing special about this pain, the amount of suffering in-
volved tilts the balance of suffering in a way that is, quantitatively, unfair to 
ritually slaughtered animals. Indeed, it seems fair to say that, whatever the 
assessment of death to which one subscribes, ritually slaughtered animals suf-
fer more than non-ritually slaughtered animals. Hence, we seem to discriminate 
against ritually slaughtered animals. And, if we ought to be concerned with the 
suffering of animals because suffering is intrinsically wrong, and in virtue of 
the fact that we have some direct duties to animals, this discriminatory treat-
ment is unjustified.  
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At this point, we may wonder why we should be concerned with the principle 
of non-discrimination between types of animals if we are ready to kill them.14 
After all, non-discrimination might derive from the principle of equal treatment, 
and theories that invoke the principle of equal treatment of animals, whether in 
the form of equal status for individuals or the principle of equal consideration of 
interests, would not allow the killing and exploitation of animals for the purpose 
of human nourishment.15 Put this way, the idea of equality or non-discrimination 
seems to be either misplaced or the kind of concern that should be taken into 
account only after considering a more fundamental normative principle, that is, 
respect for animal life and the minimization of animal suffering. Furthermore, 
one may think that the broad welfarist position discussed here resembles utilitari-
anism in certain respects. And, as we have seen, utilitarianism is not committed to 
non-discrimination per se, unless it can be demonstrated to be conducive to a 
greater aggregate well-being. Indeed, one may say that in a version of act utilitar-
ianism that is not committed to Singer’s inter-specific egalitarianism of interests, 
my worry regarding non-discrimination would not be warranted. After all, on 
such a view, discriminating against the interests of a class of human or non-
human individuals might in principle be justified if such discrimination would 
bring about a better aggregate outcome for all.16 In sum, it is not clear that we can 
justify the duty not to discriminate between types of animals if we do not accept a 
proper form of egalitarianism for animals.  
While these objections are interesting, I submit that there are reasons for 
taking the non-discrimination of animals seriously even from the welfarist 
perspective discussed here. This can be proved without making reference to the 
egalitarian principles embraced by some rights-based theories. The advantage 
of this strategy is that the resulting argument will be more acceptable from a 
number of perspectives, including those that are at odds with inter-specific egali-
tarianism. To prove this, I will proceed, first, by advancing a positive argument in 
favor of my proposal and, second, by calling the tenability of the alternative view 
into question. In other words, I will first sketch the idea that a direct-duty per-
spective implicitly commits us to the principle of non-discrimination. Second, I 
will argue that the alternative, namely of discriminating between ritually and non-
ritually slaughtered animals, has a bigger burden of proof and that the reasons 
available to ground such a discrimination are unconvincing.  
                                                             
14  I am grateful to Peter Niesen and Svenja Ahlhaus for pressing me to respond to this question.  
15  For the former category, see Regan (1983) and Francione (2008), for the latter, see Singer 
(1993). 
16  If so, however, it is not clear how such a non-egalitarian act utilitarianism could justify the 
discriminatory treatment of ritually slaughtered animals with respect to non-ritually 
slaughtered ones. Certainly, this measure is more beneficial to the non-ritually slaughtered 
animals, but it would be preferable to benefit both categories provided that such equal 
treatment is not disadvantageous in other respects. In sum, this discrimination is sub-
optimal on utilitarian grounds. 
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We should recall that here I am discussing views endorsing a direct obliga-
tion toward animal welfare. There are diverse ways to ground an obligation 
towards animal welfare. Whatever we think regarding the alleged animal right 
to life, respect for animal welfare might be grounded in the idea that we ought 
to respect animals’ sentience and natural dispositions. This holds true in gen-
eral, irrespective of whether we subscribe to a rights-based approach, utilitari-
anism, feminism, or welfarism. As I stated at the beginning of this paper, I do 
not defend any of these views. Instead, I am interested in understanding the 
implications of a direct approach towards animal welfare for the issue of ritual 
slaughter. I simply assume that any of these views could reasonably be defend-
ed. What all of these views, and others, have in common is the idea that if we 
owe a direct duty to an individual, that individual is supposed to have a feature 
justifying our direct duties. In other words, the individual is recognized as 
having an autonomous interest in not being harmed or in being benefited. This 
obviously puts direct views in opposition to indirect views, according to which 
– for instance, in the Kantian version – we ought not to cause unnecessary 
suffering to a being because we ought to respect humanity (not “animality”). 
This is to say that whatever theory we adopt in support of direct duties to ani-
mals, by adopting a direct view we implicitly assume that the individuals to 
whom we owe such duties have subjective interests that merit consideration in 
their own right and not (only) in virtue of other kinds of considerations, wheth-
er indirect or instrumental. In virtue of this feature of owing something to a 
being that subjectively merits such a duty, it would be strange to assume that 
other typical general meta-normative principles do not apply. If we assume, as 
we do here, that we have direct duties towards animals and a responsibility to 
maintain animal welfare, it would seem odd if we did not apply the principle of 
non-discrimination toward the beings meriting our direct duties. The opposite 
claim would certainly bear a bigger burden of proof. The burden is to explain 
why we should treat some categories of animals differently.  
To justify such a discrimination, it is worth remarking that in direct views a 
being is entitled to certain treatment in virtue of its intrinsic features, not in 
virtue of the dispositions regarding animals that the person who is under that 
duty possesses. As such, we must ask what distinguishes ritually slaughtered 
animals from non-ritually slaughtered animals, and whether such a difference is 
sufficient to justify this discrimination. The only reason for this discrimination 
is that animals are slaughtered ritually to respect the religious identity of Mus-
lims and Jews. However, there are two considerations that weaken this point in 
normative terms. First, we may say that what distinguishes ritually slaughtered 
animals from non-ritually slaughtered animals is not an intrinsic feature of 
those animals, because they are ritually slaughtered only in virtue of the inde-
pendent choice of a human being. There is no intrinsic and specific feature of 
animals that individually or collectively determines the fact that they merit 
such slaughter and that might provide a reason for grounding this discrimina-
HSR 40 (2015) 4  │  122 
tion. Second, the normative reason for this discrimination is respect for the 
right to religious freedom of Jews and Muslims. However, what this right de-
mands of us is not to discriminate a category of animals with respect to another 
category; rather, it simply demands that such a right be respected. That certain 
animals are discriminated against because of this religious need is an unfortu-
nate, but by no means necessary, consequence of the fact that there are different 
religious doctrines and techniques for slaughtering animals. This means that the 
religious difference is not a reason to discriminate against a category of animals 
when there are alternatives available (and we will see in the next section what 
the alternative is), because Jewish and Muslim practices do not demand that 
ritually slaughtered animals suffer more than other animals. On the contrary, as 
we have seen, ritual slaughter was probably devised as a practice for minimiz-
ing animal suffering according to the technological knowledge of the age in 
which the practice was adopted.17 
Now we can respond to the non-egalitarian utilitarian objection raised 
above. Although it is true that the welfarist approach I propose here would not 
be vindicated by this form of utilitarianism, it is not clear in our case how such a 
non-egalitarian act utilitarianism could justify the unequal treatment of ritually 
slaughtered animals with respect to non-ritually slaughtered ones. Certainly, this 
measure is more beneficial to the non-ritually slaughtered animals, but it would 
be preferable to benefit both categories provided that the equal treatment is not 
disadvantageous in other respects. And the only way to argue against this non-
discrimination would be to point at the major costs incurred in granting better 
treatment to ritually slaughtered animals. Although this is certainly a serious 
argument, it is doubtful that even from this perspective the mere matter of costs 
would outweigh the interests of ritually slaughtered animals in suffering less.  
Hence, in virtue of the implicit commitment to non-discrimination of the di-
rect view and the lack of justification for discrimination, there seems no reason 
not to uphold the principle of non-discrimination when it comes to animals, at 
least with respect to their overall welfare and suffering.  
5.  A Possible Solution and a Modest, Though Provocative, 
Proposal  
To remedy the discrimination suffered by ritually slaughtered animals, one may 
argue that we ought to abandon ritual slaughter altogether. This is one plausible 
solution. But the more radical solution of banning the raising and killing of 
                                                             
17  The same holds true at the legal level. In other words, even if the argument I propose here 
was not a morally conclusive argument, it would be strange in a legal sense to treat ritually- 
and non-ritually slaughtered animals differently. 
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animals seems to result from the same premises. However, if we want to make 
sense of current legislation and if we take the right to freedom of religious 
expression seriously, perhaps we can devise another way out of this unsettling 
situation.  
If we are concerned with animal welfare, but consider the killing of animals 
acceptable, and if we want to respect the right to religious freedom, but are 
worried about discriminating between ritually slaughtered and non-ritually 
slaughtered animals, perhaps we could demand that the two categories of ani-
mal are given equal prospects of sufficiently high well-being in terms of the 
amount of pain suffered throughout their whole lives. This means that we either 
forbid ritual slaughter – but hold independent reasons for admitting it –, or we 
demand that ritually slaughtered animals be treated better during their lives than 
those that are not ritually slaughtered, so as to compensate for the pain they suffer 
at the point of death. How this compensation should be realized depends on some 
technical issues and on the relative costs, which I cannot discuss here. Moreover, 
it depends on an estimation of an animal’s prospects of suffering, which seem 
very difficult to calculate individually and comparatively.18 Despite problems 
with putting this idea into practice, doing so would certainly be feasible with 
relatively minor changes to current methods of animal farming. To give an ex-
ample and a thumbnail criterion, it might be that ritually slaughtered animals 
ought to be raised in larger pens or enjoy more freedom to roam.  
Needless to say, the justification of this proposal depends on the supposition 
that ritual slaughter is a necessary component of religious freedom and that we 
cannot simply tell Muslims and Jews not to eat meat. In other words, this solu-
tion is acceptable only if ritual slaughter is necessary for the religious identity 
of Jews and Muslims and if we are committed to an equal recognition of reli-
gious identities. If this condition does not obtain, we may simply require Mus-
lims and Jews to abandon the practice of ritual slaughter. 
To meet this condition, it must be shown that religious identity and the in-
tegrity of believers would be violated if ritual slaughter were banned. But this 
claim has to be justified, because religiously informed practices, as well as 
other cultural practices, can change, and it is notoriously difficult and contro-
versial to distinguish between features of a cultural tradition that are essential 
to it and other features whose suppression or change would not endanger its 
continuation. Here I cannot discuss whether ritual slaughter is necessary for the 
integrity and existence of Jewish and Muslim communities. Suffice it to say 
that Muslim and Jewish communities bear at least a minimal burden of proof to 
demonstrate this, in virtue of the fact that some Muslim communities seem to 
                                                             
18  Although they concern the case of research on animals, the considerations provided by Bass 
(2012, 93-6), pointing out the structural indeterminacy of such comparisons of utility func-
tions between humans and animals and among animals themselves, seem applicable here 
and very convincing.  
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accept the religious validity of the requirement to stun animals before slaugh-
ter.19 This means that the overall permissibility of religious slaughter is subject 
to an important condition, irrespective of whether we approve the idea of com-
pensating ritually slaughtered animals that I put forward. This conditional 
qualification is important because it shows that the expression of religious 
freedom needs to be balanced with other values too.  
If we apply the principle of non-discrimination to animals and we overcome 
the unjustified assumption that the method of killing is more important than the 
method of raising animals, many objections to ritual slaughter may be lessened 
or put aside. This is particularly the case for Paula Casal’s argument rejecting 
the admissibility of exemptions from the ban on cruelty to animals on the 
grounds of cultural and religious practices. Casal’s starting assumption is as 
follows:  
I shall avoid reliance on any extravagant assumptions concerning the moral sta-
tus of animals, nor shall I argue that animals have rights or that their suffering is 
of equal moral importance to ours. […] I merely rely upon the modest assump-
tion, widely accepted by Western governments and citizens, that the existence of 
anti-cruelty legislation is desirable. Such laws are not based on sectarian views, 
but on the reasonable grounds that it is wrong to kill animals in painful ways 
when alternative less painful methods are available, and that there are sound 
moral reasons to enforce such a prohibition (Casal 2003, 2). 
In general, Casal contends that there is no sufficiently weighty or important 
interest that is capable of justifying cruelty to animals, even a need to protect 
certain cultural practices. I do not want to reject her substantive claim, which 
might of course be true. In general, however, it seems to me that her argument 
would be at least displaced, if not rebutted, if ritually slaughtered animals were 
treated better than non-ritually slaughtered animals, thus being compensated for 
the extra suffering involved during their slaughter. In this way, a standard cri-
tique leveled against claims for cultural accommodation and differential treat-
ment would be neutralized. Indeed, one of the most troubling objections to 
culturally-based differential treatment is that the beneficiaries of an exemption 
or a special treatment seem to be advantaged with respect to those who are 
compelled to abide by standard legal requirements.20 But, if animals suffering 
more during slaughter are compensated, and no overall deviation from the 
general concern for animal suffering is involved, the idea that ritual slaughter 
entails a special treatment disappears. Thus, if ritually slaughtered animals are 
                                                             
19  This is the case in Malaysia. See Department of Islamic Development Malaysia. 2011. Malay-
sian Protocol for the Halal Meat and Poultry Productions, Section 4.5.1 ‘Stunning’, 7-8, 
April 1. 
20  The most forceful critique of culturally-based exemptions from the law and differential 
treatment is outlined by Barry (2001). For a defense of a qualified and conditional account 
of exemptions from the law on the basis of conscience see Ceva (2010). For a case-based 
survey of the rule and exemption approach see Zuolo (2010). 
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not disadvantaged with respect to non-ritually slaughtered ones, there seems to 
be no need for a special justification of ritual slaughtering, because allowing it 
would not be an expression of cruelty.21 
6.  Conclusion  
To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that in this paper I have not defended 
ritual slaughter in general. Its justification is deeply conditional on its necessity 
for religious identities and on our commitment to the protection of religious 
freedom. My aim in this paper, rather, was to show that it is possible to recon-
cile a concern for animal welfare and the right to freedom of religious expres-
sion by compensating the pain caused to ritually slaughtered animals with 
better conditions during their lives. The advantage of this solution is that it 
employs a principle of fairness towards animals as well as towards human 
beings. It applies a principle of fairness to animals themselves because it com-
pensates the discrimination imposed by ritual slaughter. And it is also fair with 
respect to human beings because it does not simply concede an exemption from 
a general principle to two religious communities, but it also demands that they 
treat the ritually slaughtered animals better, without asking them to change 
their religious practice. Hence, such a solution seems to address the problems 
faced by contemporary societies regarding the difficult accommodation of 
minority claims in an environment of pluralistic values. This solution may 
seem too biased, to some people, towards the status quo regarding the overall 
treatment of animals, but it has the advantage of proposing a very feasible 
improvement of the life of many animals.  
  
                                                             
21  Claiming this, however, does not imply that we should also accept other cultural practices 
such as Santeria rituals or bullfights, which Casal mentions.  
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